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AUTHORITY AND CONSENT*
Joseph Raz**
M

Y starting point is the assumption that there is no general
obligation to obey the law, not even a prima facie obligation
and not even in a just society. This assumption is perhaps becoming more popular. In recent years it has been defended by several
writers.1 There is more that needs to be said in its support, but I
will not attempt to do so here. Instead, I will reflect on a problem
posed by accepting it, a problem concerning the relations between
an individual citizen and the state. It is common to think that the
state has authority over its citizens and that they owe it allegiance.
If there is no general obligation to obey the law, does it not follow
that the state has no authority over its citizens and that they do
not owe it allegiance? 2
After first explaining briefly the assumption and the problem it
creates, I shall consider different attempts at solving it which try
to show that recognition of an authority does not entail belief in an
obligation to obey that authority. These attempts at solving the
problem fail. I shall then turn to one traditional argument concerning the foundations of the state's authority: the argument that
political authority rests on consent.

L

I.

THE PROBLEM

We are concerned with the proper attitude of a conscientious
person toward a reasonably just state of which he is a citizen. No
assumption is made that it is a perfectly just state. It is probably
Copyright 0 1981 by Joseph Raz.
Fellow and Tutor in Jurisprudence, Balliol College, Oxford.
See J. RAz, The Obligationto Obey the Law, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 233 (1979); A.
SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL OBLIGATION (1979); A. WoozLEY, LAW AND OBEDIENCE (1979); Smith, Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?, 82 YALE L.J.
950 (1973). From a different point of view, R.P. Wolff reaches similar conclusions. See R.
**

WOLFF, IN DEFENSE OF ANARCHISM (1970).
2 I will not be concerned with the relations between noncitizens and the state. "Citizen"
in this essay is not meant as a legal category but as a moral and political one to which the
law should conform. I will refer to the authority of the state, of the government, and of
society interchangeably, for the considerations discussed in this article do not require distinguishing among them.
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not humanly possible to maintain perfect institutions. On the
other hand, the problems of one's attitude to a fundamentally iniquitous state are not of present concern. To deny that there is an
obligation to obey the law is not, of course, to claim that one
should disobey the law, nor even that it does not matter whether
one obeys or disobeys. It is to deny that there is a sound general
argument establishing as its conclusion that, if the law of a reasonably just state requires a citizen of that state to behave in a certain
way, then he has an obligation so to behave. What is denied is that
the fact that something is a law creates such an obligation. Therefore, the denial of an obligation to obey is compatible with the
view that in most cases, or even in all of them, one is obligated to
conform to the law provided that the source of the obligation is not
always that the action is required by law. Furthermore, while not
all citizens are bound to obey, it is possible that some are subject
to such an obligation by virtue of, e.g., a promise they made always
to obey the law.
There is considerable practical importance to the assumption
that there is no general obligation to obey the law. People informed by it are likely to find numerous occasions on which it will
make a difference to their practical reasoning, leading them not
only to revise their appreciation of the right reasons for complying
with the law but, on occasion, to the view that the reasons for compliance, which might have been adequate had there been an obligation to obey, are inadequate in its absence. It is intriguing to investigate in detail the types of occasions on which our assumption is
likely to lead to different valid conclusions as to what is best to do.
But this, too, is a task not to be undertaken here beyond commenting briefly on one aspect of the question that is relevant to my
main topic.
One category of acts of disobedience, the status of which is unaffected by the assumption, is the class of politically motivated acts
of disobedience. There is a general and valid reason to refrain from
political disobedience be it civil or revolutionary. One ought to
support just institutions, and in a just state one ought to support
the state. It does not follow, however, that one ought to obey the
law of a just state, for many acts of obedience do not at all support
the existence or the justice of the state and its organs, and many
acts of disobedience do nothing to undermine them. Politically motivated disobedience, on the other hand, tends to undermine politi-
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cal institutions whether it is intended to do so or not. To be successful, politically motivated disobedience must normally have
publicly known consequences, and this normally ensures that, if
successful, the fact that breach of law with political consequences
occurred will be a matter of public knowledge; such knowledge
tends to undermine the political institutions involved. Hence, one
has reason not to engage in political disobedience in a just society.
Much recent discussion of the obligation to obey the law was stimulated by reflection on the conditions under which civil disobedience is justified. Such discussion was often meant to establish that
those proposing civil disobedience must have a strong case to justify such action, strong enough to override a prima facie reason not
to engage in such action. I wholeheartedly agree with this view.
Unfortunately, many writers have overstated their case by claiming
to have established a general obligation to obey the law.
The assumption that
WA: A citizen has no general obligation to obey
the law even in a just state
raises a question concerning the proper attitude of a person to his
state. The question can be brought into sharper focus by articulating another assumption that underlies much of what has already
been said:
RSA: Just states are humanly possible.
Just states, it will be recalled, are not perfectly just ones. They are
merely reasonably just, or just on the whole. Such states are not
merely logically possible. They are also humanly possible. There is
nothing in human nature or in the human condition, in nature or
history, to make their realization an impossibility.
RSA is a rejection of strong anarchism. It is an admission that
the state and the law can fulfill an important and valuable function. They do so primarily when, through the machinery of legal
remedies and sanctions, they make more people behave as they
should and when they initiate and maintain beneficial schemes of
social cooperation that would otherwise fail because of prisoners'
dilemma factors or other reasons. At the same time, WA is a
weakly anarchic assumption, for it amounts to a rejection of the
general authority of the state. To have authority, it has often been
said, is to have a right to command, a right to which corresponds
an obligation to obey incumbent on those who are rightly subject
to that authority. WA denies the state, even the just state, author-
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ity; RSA justifies, under certain conditions, the existence of the
state. But is not a just state without legitimate authority a contradiction? Some aspects of this apparent paradox are the subject of
this essay.

II.

AUTHORITY AND JUSTIFIED POWER

One important attempt to dissolve the paradox is to reinterpret
the notion of authority so as to make it consistent with WA. That
is, legitimate authority should be understood in a way that entitles
one to say that a just political power has authority even though its
subjects have no obligation to obey it. In discussing three such interpretations, I will, though intending to return to the problems of
political authority, extend the discussion to considerations affecting authority in general. Political authority shares with other kinds
of authority its character as an authority. A discussion of the concept of authority cannot be confined to one type of the genus.
One interpretation of authority that, if successful, achieves the
desired result makes legitimate authority dependent on de facto
authority and defines legitimate authority as justified (in some
sense) de facto authority. De facto authority is then defined as (a
form of) power over people. Here the paradox is avoided, since one
can admit that it is justified that a person has certain power without conceding an obligation to obey him.
This analysis fails because the notion of de facto authority itself
cannot be understood except by reference to that of legitimate authority. De facto authority is not just an ability to affect people's
actions and beliefs. Such power to influence, though possessed by
people who have de facto authority, is not confined to them. Propaganda and advertising influence people, but those who use them
do not necessarily have authority. Much power is exercised by
changing the situation facing people. A strike by the workers or a
lockout by their employer may affect people's actions and beliefs
in the intended way, yet the exercise of such power has nothing to
do with the possession of authority, de facto or otherwise.
The influence an authority has is more conscious or (at least potentially) rational. It is not exercised through manipulating people.
It works through their reasoning about what to do or to believe.
This condition may exclude certain forms of suggestive advertising
and rousing propaganda; it will not exclude other forms of those
activities that affect people by propagating information and views,
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nor will it exclude activities that influence people by changing
their circumstances. The power of authority is more direct. It is
exercised simply by the authority expressing its wish that something is to be done or believed. But on reflection, this is much too
wide a category. Parents are as much in the habit of acceding to
their children's wishes as children are inclined to obey their parents, yet only the parents have authority. Children obey (at least
sometimes) because they accept the authority of their parents.
Usurpers differ from highwaymen in claiming that they are entitled to command, and that is why their success establishes that
they have de facto authority. In other words, to have de facto authority it is not enough to have power to influence people. It is also
necessary that such power is either coupled with a claim to authority or is efficacious at least partly through people's belief that the
person or body who wields the power has authority to do so.
III.

THE RECOGNITIONAL CONCEPTION

To perceive clearly our notion of authority, it helps to concentrate on the attitude of people who recognize its legitimacy. One
can then most clearly discern what authority is by seeing what one
acknowledges when acknowledging that a person has legitimate authority. The first point to emerge from the discussion so far is that
the influence of authority is not manipulative but direct and normative. Characteristically, it affects people's practical reasoning by
means of authoritative utterances. It is a necessary condition for a
person to have authority, to be in authority, or to be an authority
that some of his utterances are authoritative. In this essay only the
nature of this condition is examined. A person who accepts that A
has authority is a person accepting the soundness of arguments of
the form:
A has authority;
A decreed that x is to (or A has said that p);
Therefore, x ought to ¢ (or one ought to believe that p).
Many conceptions of authority are different interpretations of this
inference form. One such conception I shall call the recognitional
conception. According to it, one ought to follow an authority because to recognize its authority is to realize that there are independent reasons to do or to believe as it advises. The recognitional
conception regards acknowledging an authority as having confidence in its judgment, trusting its opinion. The assumption is that
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an authoritative utterance informs one of what one has reason to
do or believe anyway. To accept an utterance as authoritative is to
regard it as a reason to believe that one has reason to do or to
believe as told.
The recognitional conception aims to avoid our problem in a new
way. Authoritative utterances are reasons, but they are reasons for
belief, not for action. Therefore, regarding someone as an authority
does not entail a belief that one has a reason to obey him, since
reasons for obedience are reasons for action. It is best to evaluate
separately the success of this conception to account for practical
and for theoretical authority.
Practical authority is authority affecting what is to be done. According to the recognitional conception, the utterances of legitimate authority do not affect the balance of reasons. They are not
themselves reasons for action, nor do they create any such reasons.
They merely provide information about the balance of reasons as
they exist separately and independently of such utterances. This is
not to make light of the importance of authority as interpreted by
this conception. After all, people act not on the reasons there are
but on those they believe there are (insofar as they act on reason
at all). Therefore, the recognitional conception has an explanation
to offer as to how it is that authoritative utterances, though not
themselves reasons for action, can affect one's reasoning about
practical problems. Yet it is the essence of this view that all authority is essentially theoretical, i.e., that it provides one only with
reasons for belief, never with reasons for action. The so-called
practical authority is reinterpreted as authority concerning belief
in deontic propositions. The authoritative utterances of practical
authorities are reasons to believe that one ought to do that which
the utterance says one should.
Such an account of practical authority is fundamentally flawed.
It is, for example, unable to account for the role of authority in the
solution of coordination problems. Those are problems where the
interests of members of the group coincide in that, among a set of
options, the members prefer that which will be followed by the
bulk of the members of the group above all else. One does not
mind whether one drives on the left or the right provided everyone
else does the same. There are many such problems of great importance to the orderly conduct of any society. A wise man can tell me
which options belong to that set, but he cannot tell me which of
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the set to choose before it is known what others will do. Sometimes
that can be known on the basis of existing facts. Many people are
likely to believe that many will choose a particular option and
therefore they will choose it themselves; hence, one has reason to
follow them and choose it as well.$ Sometimes, however, there is no
option in the designated set that will be the obvious choice. In
such cases, what one needs is something that will make a particular
option the one to follow. This is something practical authorities
often do (or attempt to do). They designate one of the options as
the one to be chosen and, if their action is regarded as a reason to
adopt that course of action, then a successful resolution of the
problem is found. Since solving coordination problems is one of the
important tasks of political and many other practical authorities
and as their relative success in it can only be explained by regarding authoritative utterances as reasons for action, one must reject
the recognitional account of practical authority.
This criticism is enough to show that the recognitional view is
unacceptable. There is, however, some interest in showing first
that the same objection cannot be raised against this conception
viewed as an account of theoretical authority and, second, that all
the same it cannot explain the nature of such authorities. Normally one's statement that something is the case is at best a parasitic rather than an original reason for holding that it is indeed the
case. That is, normally a statement is a reason for belief in its content only to the extent that it is a reason to believe that the
speaker had other grounds for accepting it. He saw it happen, or
he had a firsthand account of the event, or he had other inferential
grounds for reaching this conclusion. The two main exceptions to
2

I am grateful to J. L. Mackie for pointing out to me that this can sometimes be based on

authoritative advice:
Imagine a society into which wheeled vehicles have just been introduced, but where
there is as yet no rule of the road. There is a local wise man who is reputed to be able
to foretell future events, but no government with local political authority. Observing
the chaos on the roads, the wise man announces: "I foresee that from tomorrow

morning most people will drive on the left." Since most people either believe that he
has the power to foresee the future, or believe that most others believe this, nearly
everyone who hears the announcement will, from sheer prudence, start driving on the
left himself. The wise man's clairvoyance will thus be confirmed, and he will be in a
stronger position to solve whatever the next co-ordination problem may be.
Letter from J. L. Mackie to Joseph Raz. Such cases, being based on shared false beliefs, are
unlikely to be so common as to explain the function of authority in all coordination
situations.
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this rule are self-verifying utterances such as "I am alive" and
avowals, i.e., a person's reports of his own mental states or experiences. In both cases, there can in principle be other reasons for
believing in the statement made. There are ways of establishing
that a person is alive or is in pain other than his saying so, but his
saying so is an original reason for the truth of the statement.
It is significant that we do not talk of people as authorities with
respect to those utterances that are original reasons. The fact,
which is quite separate from those just discussed, that a person is
normally the best judge of his own mental states does occasionally
lead one to say things like "and he is of course the best authority
about his own feelings," but these statements are generally taken
as a metaphorical extension of the use of "authority." It is more
natural to say of someone that he is the best authority on another's
(say, Stalin's) thoughts and intentions. Theoretical authority
seems, therefore, to conform to the recognitional conception. Inasmuch as authoritative utterances are parasitic reasons to believe in
their content, they tend to show that there are other independent
reasons for accepting the truth of the statements made by the authorities concerned. It is equally clear that this is not enough to
characterize theoretical authority: not every witness is an authority. Not everyone who has gone over the evidence and come to
some conclusion is an authority. But both the testimony of the witness and the view of the man who worked on the evidence are parasitic reasons for belief. The missing element is that theoretical authorities must be experts. They may be experts because of their
superior perceptual powers (an expert wine taster), or because of
their privileged access to secret information (the only scholar allowed into the archive), or because of their superior ability to identify and evaluate the evidence (the expert pathologist). No account
of theoretical authority is complete that does not explain the connection between being an authority and being an expert.
IV. THE INSPIRATIONAL CONCEPTION
The conception that I will call inspirational is perhaps marginal,
but presents interesting features. It can best be introduced by reflecting on the well-known apparent dilemma in explaining the
moral authority of God. Either the moral law is valid because it
emanates from God's will or its validity is independent of God. If
the latter is the case, then God is not the ultimate moral authority.
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His own goodness and the justice of His commands have to be
tested by the independent criterion of their conformity to the
moral law. Morality is independent of belief in God, since agnostics
and atheists can accept the independently valid moral law. God is
irrelevant to morality.
On the other hand, how can the fact that the moral law is God's
will endow it with validity? Why should one obey God's will? Admittedly He is omnipotent and can punish those who disobey Him.
It may therefore be prudent to obey Him, but this can hardly endow His command with moral character. To reply that His will is
to be obeyed because it is good is to presuppose an independent
moral standard by which God's will is measured. To do this is to
return to the first horn of the dilemma. Therefore, on either possibility God is irrelevant to morality. His will and command provide
people neither with a standard that one has any reason to call
moral nor with a motive for action that can be regarded as a moral
motive.
There are various traditional ways of struggling with the dilemma. I shall not examine them, for my interest is not theological.
One answer, which I think is the best and most promising one, is of
present interest for the light it sheds on authority generally. According to it, all who know God love Him. It is possible to doubt or
even to deny God's existence. Those who do so obviously do not
love Him. Given human nature, however, it is impossible for those
who know Him not to love Him. Loving Him includes wanting to
do His will. This is a purely non-self-interested motivation and
therefore a moral one. According to this view, God's will sets moral
standards; it does not merely reflect independently valid standards. They are valid because they express His will. There is, however, no difficulty concerning the motivation to obey. The love that
He inevitably inspires in all who know Him is that motivation.
(This does not mean that those who love Him will always obey
Him, for they may be overcome by other motives.) The unselfish,
non-self-interested character of the motivation assures both it and
the command toward which it is directed of a moral character.
This is inspirational authority, for the reason we ought to obey it
is that we want to and the wish to do so is not preconceived, is not
derived from our other interests and needs. It is inspired by the
recognition of the nature of the person or body in authority. If this
is the character of God's authority, is it the model on which all
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human authority should be understood?
Similar attitudes are found in human relations. As we all know
from our experience, affection for another often leads people to
conceive desires and wishes, because the person toward whom they
have the affection would be pleased if they had such wishes and
tastes or acted on them. The appearance of such desires is one necessary mark for affection to count as love. The desires I have in
mind are to be distinguished strictly from desires to do certain
things in order to please the other person. Obviously, lovers want
to please their loved ones and sometimes act for that reason. This
is common in all friendly relations between people. I am referring
to a much rarer phenomenon existing paradigmatically in loving
relations, and not very frequently even there, in which one comes
to desire something for its own sake because one knows that this
will please the loved one.
One may, for example, come to enjoy Byrd's music because one's
lover does and would be pleased if this taste were shared. The
point is that one comes to enjoy Byrd's music in itself. One does
not merely like to listen to it because one's desire to listen to it
pleases the loved one. On the other hand, the pleasure in Byrd's
music was induced neither suggestively by one's trust in one's
friend's musical taste nor subconsciously. The "because he would
have wanted me to" is not merely a non-reason-giving explanation.
It is a reason, but a reason for liking Byrd's music in itself, a reason for wanting to listen to it because one enjoys it. For it is only
this that the loved person wishes.
He may be pleased that I want to listen to Byrd to please him,
but he does not want me to listen to Byrd for that reason. He simply wants me to listen to Byrd, and since doing so to please him is
doing it, it pleases him. On the other hand, he has another wish,
namely that I should like Byrd. It is a wish that I should like listening to Byrd in itself, for the pleasure it gives. Here he wishes
me to do it for a particular reason. Doing it for another reason
would not be doing as he wishes. The fact that I love him and that
he wishes it is for me a second-order reason-a reason to act for a
reason.
That second-order reason is not a desire to please him but a desire to have the desires and tastes that it would please him for me
to have, because I love him. It does not matter whether doing so
would please him. It may not please him, for he may never know of
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it. Indeed, often people are motivated in the way I have described
after the death of a person they love. It is rare to find such wishes
and desires even in love. This rarity does not, however, diminish
the importance of the phenomenon to our understanding of love. It
seems to me to represent the spiritual aspect of the image of the
lovers merging to become one. Aspiring to such fusion includes the
desire to have one will, not only through gradual adaptation, but
also by the more immediate transformation of the will through
love.
What are the implications of this to our understanding of
authority? Do the led love their leaders? A charismatic leader inspires enthusiasm and devotion, which can take many practical
and psychological forms that are often combined. Among these, the
one sometimes called blind devotion is characteristic. It is the feeling that one will follow one's leader to the end of the world. This
attitude often involves unbounded trust, namely confidence that
the leader knows best and that he has the right goals at heart. But
it does characteristically involve more-the feeling that he is so
unique and outstanding that one wants to do as he commands, because then one would be at one with him. Since charismatic leaders
often influence masses of people, there is often the additional feeling of being united with one's community by embracing the
leader's will. In such cases, I feel no hesitation in saying that the
attitude of the people to their leader is one of love or devotion
reinforced by love of the community that he represents. (None of
this is meant to suggest that there is no more to love than the
desire to unite one's will with that of the loved one. I am only suggesting that when this desire is present so are the other elements
of love.)
I said that this attitude is often regarded as blind devotion. My
explanation of it makes it appear no blinder than any other love. It
is not inherently irrational, as one is often inclined to think. If it is
generally undesirable, this could only be because one's attitude to
one's leaders and community should not be one of love, because
love is appropriate in personal relations but not in politics, or because all-embracing love is out of place in politics. Be that as it
may, since not all authority is political, there may be proper room
for inspirational authority in other contexts. Could it be, for example, that parental authority is sometimes quite properly of this
kind? Here we face a major difficulty in the inspirational concep-
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tion of authority.

First, even if some authorities are of this mold, it is clear that
not all are and arguable that many should not be. Most political
authorities and all scientific authorities are not recognized through
love and are not inspirational in character; it is arguable that this
conception has no role at all in the explanation of scientific and all
other theoretical authorities, and that ideally no political authority
should have this character. Second, even when love alid authority
are combined, as in the case of some parental relations, the two are
distinct and should not be confused. After all, parents' love for
their children can be every bit as great as and of a similar character to children's love for their parents, and yet parents do not as a
rule admit that their children have authority over them. More generally, many loving relations involving the occasional transformation of the will that was described before do not involve any recognition of authority. It follows that even where, as in some cases of
charismatic authority, the inspirational conception does illuminate
an important aspect of the authority relation, it fails to explain
why it is an authority relationship at all. It does not touch the essence of authority. It merely explains some features that may
sometimes accompany its instantiation.
V.

AUTHORITY AND REASON

The inspirational conception offers a solution to the problem
concerning political authority with which we started. It allows that
the authoritative utterances of political authorities are reasons for
action, which is the source of the problem, but it places authority
firmly in a context of a relationship and a network of preferences
that guarantees that no sooner is an authoritative utterance made
and recognized than its addressee desires to comply and has reason
to do so in the context of relationship with the authority. The rejection of the conception and of the explanations of authority that
we have examined only serves to reemphasize our initial problem,
for the results of this discussion are not purely negative. They
point to the fact that it is a necessary condition of a person's
having authority that his authoritative utterances are themselves
reasons for action or for belief.
Authoritative utterances can be called "content-independent"
reasons. There is no direct connection between the reason and the
action or belief for which it is a reason. The reason is in the appar-
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ently "extraneous" fact that someone in authority has said so and
within certain limits his saying so would be reason for any number
of actions or beliefs, including (in typical cases) for contradictory
ones. A certain authority may command me to leave the room or to
stay in it. Either way, its command will be a reason. This marks
authoritative reasons as content-independent. By this feature they
can be distinguished from many other reasons, including various
other kinds of utterances that are reasons.
There are, however, other content-independent reasons, and to
be complete a characterization of authoritative utterances must
distinguish them. One group, including promises and vows, is
clearly different in that its members are reasons for the agent only,
whereas authoritative utterances are reasons for others as well. It
is interesting to compare threats and offers with authoritative utterances. Threats are reasons and they are content-independent.
They are reasons for belief that a certain unpleasant eventuality
will come about, if something that the threatened person is alleged
to have at least a chance of controlling will occur (the triggering
event). It is the conditional occurrence of that unpleasant event,
and not the threat, that is the reason for avoiding the condition
that will bring it about. Threats differ from ordinary communications of information about unpleasant future events conditional on
the addressee's action, for it is alleged that the occurrence of the
unpleasant future event is under the control of the person making
the threat (or at least that he has a chance of controlling it), that
he has decided to prevent it only if the threatened person will prevent the triggering event, and that this decision was taken in order
to be able to try to make the threatened person prevent the triggering event by threatening him. In the absence of the last condition the utterance is not a threat but a warning.
Threats (and, for similar reasons, offers) are content-independent reasons for belief, because the speakers have privileged access
to the information they are communicating. Their utterances are
original rather than derivative reasons for belief and, as was seen
in Section HII, this excludes assigning to them authoritative status.
Requests are another kind of content-independent reason. It
would be wrong to regard requests as a communication of information that the speaker or somebody else in whose interest the request is made needs or wants something and that he wants the
addressee to help him get it. Although every request at least im-
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plies some such information, it is possible to communicate such
information without requesting. This is admittedly very rare, since
understandably a conventional way of requesting is by telling a
person that one would like him to do something. It is possible,
however, to tell a person that, while I would like him to do something for me, I am not asking and am not going to ask him to do it.
This may be said in reply to a question from a very close friend
with whom relations are temporarily somewhat strained. The point
of the distinction thus drawn is that, while one would be pleased if
one's need will move the friend into action, one would be displeased if it takes a request to do so. This presupposes that the
request is a reason over and above the need and the desire to be
helped by the friend. This account explains why one might request
even when one knows that the other person knows of one's need
and of one's desire for help and that he and others know that one
knows this.
None of this is meant to deny that requesting involves stating or
implying that there is a reason for the addressee to act as requested, but the specific quality of requests is that they are acts
intended to communicate to their addressee the speaker's intention that the addressee shall regard the act of communication as a
reason for a certain action. The speaker's intention is not to make
the addressee do as requested, but merely to create a reason for
such action. The speaker realizes that there may be, unknown to
him, overwhelming reasons against acceding to the request, and he
does not wish the addressee to do as requested in such a case. The
speaker leaves it to the addressee to judge what is right. He intends to influence him only by tipping the balance somewhat in
favor of the requested action.
Orders and commands are among the expressions typical of
practical authority, and it will help clarify the nature of authoritative utterances to compare requests and commands. Only those
who have authority can command and, in purporting to command,
one presents oneself as having authority to do so. The conclusion
of the discussion so far leads to the view that both in requesting
and in commanding the speaker intends the addressee to recognize
the utterance as a reason for action. The difference between them
is that a valid command (i.e., one issued by a person in authority)
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imposes an obligation, whereas requests are ordinary reasons.'
To conclude: legitimate authority implies an obligation to obey
on the part of those subject to it. Since our starting point was the
assumption that there is no general obligation to obey incumbent
on citizens qua citizens, we are back with our original problem:
does it follow that there is no legitimate political authority? It is
important to remember that the foregoing considerations cast no
doubt at all on the existence of de facto authorities. A person or
body of persons has de facto authority if it claims legitimate authority and if its claim is accepted by some people, thus giving it
actual power. The power of a governmental de facto authority can
and normally does extend to people who do not accept its authority. They are subject to its power partly because those who accept
its authority are willing to obey its instructions, even when they
affect people who do not accept its authority. Governments are de
facto authorities. They claim legitimate authority over a population, and they have power and control over it. A government remains a government regardless of whether or not it has legitimate
authority. In a rough and ready way one can divide the ways in
which a government controls and influences people into three.
First, some accept its claim to authority and obey its instructions
because they regard them as binding on them. Second, the government can and does manipulate the environment-physical, economic, and social-in which people live. It constructs roads, flattens hills, digs canals and harbours, fixes the rate of exchange of
the currency, employs workers, and contracts for services. In all
these and similar ways a government can exercise power and control other people without attempting thereby to exercise authority
over them. Finally, a government controls people by subjecting
them to its rules even if they do not accept its authority and seeing
to it that others will (either because they accept its authority or
are under contract) enforce these rules.
These remarks are meant to show that governments govern not
See J. RAz, Legitimate Authority, in THE AuTHORITY OF LAW 3 (1979); Raz, Promises
and Obligations,in LAw, MoRALrrY AND SocIErY (P. Hacker & J. Raz eds. 1977). Theoretical
authorities do not impose obligations, but their authoritative utterances are reasons of a
similar kind. In matters of belief, authority is enjoyed by the expert over the nonexpert. The
latter, being unable to assess the experts' opinions against such direct evidence as is known
to him, must give the expert opinion a peremptory status similar to that which obligations
enjoy compared with ordinary reasons for action.
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only through purporting to exercise authority. Does this fact solve
our problem? Can one reconcile the rejection of strong anarchism
and the assertion of the possibility of a just government with the
rejection of a general obligation to obey the law by saying that a
government can be just only if it does not purport to exercise authority? This reconciliation, attractive as it appears, fails for one
simple reason. Though government can exercise power over people
without asserting authority over them, it cannot exercise power
without asserting authority over some people some of the time. A
body that did not claim authority at all and did not purport to
exercise it might be very powerful, but it could not be a government. If a just state is possible, then a just government is possible,
and this implies the possibility of justified authority and hence,
given the preceding analysis, of a binding obligation to obey the
law. Can this conclusion be reconciled with the denial of a general
obligation to obey the law?
The concept of "authority" is essentially relational. One can
have authority over some people and not over others. If citizens
have no general obligation to obey the law, then the state has no
authority over them merely by virtue of their being, citizens. It
does not follow, however, that no one is subject to the authority of
the state. The state can be given authority by some or all of its
citizens, and it has authority over those who gave it authority. To
explore this possibility, we should turn to the problem of consent
as the foundation of political authority.
VI.

CONSENT

The long tradition that regards consent as either the foundation
or a foundation of legitimate political authority displays two separable strands of thought. One, deriving from Hobbes and Locke,
regards the consent given as an expression of rational, enlightened
self-interest. Its approach is instrumental. One consents to the establishment of a political society and to its authority because of
the benefits one will derive from its existence. The other approach,
deriving from Rousseau, regards consent noninstrumentally. The
consent is a constitutive element both of the condition of the person who gives it and of the society resulting from it, which is good

19811

Authority and Consent

in itself.5
In this section I will offer an analysis of consent. I will then
show, in the next section, how the noninstrumental approach to
consent allows for a natural extension of the notion of acceptance
of an authority to some cases where there is no consent. "Consent"
means consent to a change in the normative situation of another-to a change in his rights and duties. It is sometimes expressed and is spoken of in terms of what is agreed. Consent is,
however, narrower than agreement and is roughly equivalent to the
performative sense of "agreement." One can agree that another has
or should have a right, that is, believe that he has or should have
it, or agree to give him a right. The first is a cognitive agreement.
The second is a performative one.' By agreeing to give him a right,
one purports to give it to him or one promises to do so in the future (the expression is ambiguous). Though consent, if valid, has
normative consequences and can only be explained through its
purported normative consequences, it does not bear its normativeness on its face. The typical expressions using "consent" are "X
"1
consented to Y's doing. . ." or "X consented to Y's being ....
The second is completed by specifying a position or role the occupier of which possesses certain rights and duties, and which the
consent purports to allow Y to occupy. For example, "I consented
to his being the leader." The first kind of sentence is completed by
specifying an action, and the consent purports to give Y a right to
perform it. Less commonly, consent can be given to duties or requirements imposed on other people. For example, "He consented
to his son's being obliged to retake the examination." Consent is
' Both types of consent arguments are based on actual consent and differ from the hypothetical consent views recently made popular by John Rawls, which are a form of moral
argument concerning the way a fair-minded person should reconcile his interests with those
of others. Hypothetical consent theories tend to share the instrumental attitude of the
Hobbesian tradition.
I Theories of hypothetical consent discuss not consent but cognitive agreement. It is the
essence of consent that its actuality changes the normative situation. One may ask what one
would have had to do had one consented, but this is in no way relevant to what one has to
do given that one did not. What one would have believed in certain circumstances is equally
immaterial to what one should now believe. But that one should have believed something in
a hypothetical situation may and often is used as part of an argument to establish what one
should now believe. See A. WoozLzy, supra note 1, at 93-97.
7 Impersonal consent sentences are quantified sentences of the kinds described: "You
consented to your dismissal" means "you consented to being dismissed by whoever has authority to do so."
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given by any behavior (action or omission) undertaken in the belief
(1) that it will change the normative situation of another; (2) that
it will do so because it is undertaken with such a belief; and (3)
that it will be understood by its observers to be of this character.
The third condition characterizes consent as a (purportedly)
public action.8 The core use of "consent" is its use in the performative sense. This sense is explained by the combination of the first
two conditions, and since it is a performative purporting to affect
the rights or duties of another, it has to be public at least in intention. Consenting is very similar to promising. Both change the normative situation of another, and both purport to do so by voluntary acts undertaken in the belief that they have these normative
consequences. Yet consenting and promising, while overlapping,
are not the same.
According to Simmons, consenting differs from promising in two
ways:
First, consent in the strict sense is always given to the actions of
other persons. Thus, I may consent to my daughter's marriage, to
be governed by the decisions of the majority, or to my friend's
handling my financial affairs. Promises, on the other hand, cannot,
except in very special circumstances, ever be made concerning the
actions of another person. Further, while both promises and consent generate special rights and obligations, the emphases in the
two cases are different. The primary purpose of a promise is to
undertake an obligation; the special rights which arise for the
promisee are in a sense secondary. In giving consent to another's
actions, however, our primary purpose is to authorize those actions
and in so doing create for or accord to another a special right to
act: the obligation generated on the consentor not to interfere with
the exercise of this right takes, in this case, the secondary role.'
This is not quite right. One consents not only to actions but also to
the holding of certain positions and to the imposition of duties and
requirements. Promises quite often concern the actions of others:
to consent to be governed by another is to promise to obey him; to
consent to his joining the expedition is to promise to provide him
with the facilities and the help made available to members of the
5 Consenting in one's heart is not a performative consent but a psychological state similar
to coming to terms with.
9 A. SIMMONS, supra note 1, at 76.
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expedition. Finally, these cases where to consent is to promise refute the suggestion that in one case the purpose is to confer rights
and in the other to undertake obligations.
Promising differs from consenting in three respects. The first
two make consenting wider and the third makes it narrower than
promising. First, while promising always purports to impose obligations on the promisor, consenting does not always do so. Two
cases of consent can be distinguished. In the first, consent does not
purport to affect adversely the agent's personal normative situation. The President may consent to a bill imposing a new tax or
conferring certain rights. The commanding officer may consent to
his soldiers' being assigned certain duties by another officer. The
second kind of case includes those where the agent's personal normative situation is adversely affected by his consent if it is valid,
i.e., if it has its purported normative consequences. In the first
type of case, but not necessarily in the second, the consent is a
response to a proposal initiated by another. Consent can adversely
affect the normative situation of the agent either by placing him
under an obligation or by derogating from his rights. One can
waive one's rights by consenting but not by promising. There are,
therefore, two kinds of consent that do not impose an obligation on
the agent: First, where his personal situation is not affected by the
consent; and second, where his personal situation is affected, but
by waiving a right rather than by undertaking an obligation. It is
worth noting, however, that consent to a political authority is the
same as a promise to obey it. It is the undertaking of an obligation.
Second, promises are made by acts intended to undertake obligations and confer rights. Only acts whose purpose is to realize this
result are promises; not so consent. Acts undertaken for another
purpose and not in order to consent can constitute consent if undertaken in the belief that they will confer a right or impose a duty
and if the fact that they are undertaken with such a belief is the
reason for them having this result. Typical examples are cases
where one is given notice that everyone who enters a certain house,
club, or park must abide by certain rules, obey a certain authority,
or do so at his own risk.
The third difference points to an aspect in which promisings are
wider than acts of consent. Two kinds of rights can be distinguished that are sometimes referred to as rights of action (e.g., a
right to join the expedition) and of recipience (e.g., a right to be
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paid a certain sum of money). Many rights are no doubt mixed
cases. Promises can be acts purporting to confer rights of either
kind, whereas consent purports to confer rights of action or those
that include a right of action. One does not by consent purport to
confer a pure right of recipience.' °
I have emphasized that consent is an act purporting to change
the normative situation. Not every act of consent succeeds in doing
so, and those that succeed do so because they fall under reasons,
not themselves created by consent, that show why acts of consent
should, within certain limits, be a way of creating rights and duties. We cannot create reasons just by intending to do so and expressing that intention in action. Reasons precede the will. Though
the latter can, within limits, create reasons, it can do so only when
there is a non-will-based reason why it should. Admitting this, it
might nevertheless be claimed that a person's consenting entails,
as a matter of the meaning of consent, not only that he acted in
the way I have described, but that his action has its purported normative consequences. Against this interpretation lies the evidence
that we can and do say, when appropriate, things like "of course he
consented to the operation, but that does not entitle you to perform it since he is just a child" (or he did not know how dangerous
it is). I would, therefore, suggest that consent is to be explained by
reference to its purported normative consequences only.
On what grounds is it ever justified to regard consent as having
its purported normative consequences? In special circumstances,
there may be a variety of occasional reasons that make the consent
valid. Most common, perhaps, are those cases where the person to
whose rights the agent consented was misled, through the agent's
fault, to believe that the consent was valid and acted reasonably on
this belief to his detriment. The agent might, for example, be at
fault if under the circumstances the consent could be taken as sufficient evidence that the agent had the power to consent (i.e., that
there were reasons for holding the consent to be valid) and the
agent should have realized this. In such cases, the agent's liability
is to make good the detriment thus caused to the person to whose
rights he consented. Occasionally this requires recognizing that the
10When one's act obliquely intends to confer a pure right of recipience, the act is neither
a promise nor a consent, but an agreement to confer such a right and undertake the corresponding obligation.

1981]

Authority and Consent

consent and the circumstances surrounding it create the rights it
purported to create.1 1
It is clear that such a justification not only depends on very
special circumstances but-is essentially parasitic. It presupposes a
reasonable belief in the existence of some other reasons for which
consent is valid in some circumstances and the misled person's
mistaken belief that these reasons apply to his case. Are there
nonparasitic reasons that justify acknowledging the validity of consent in certain classes of cases?
One is tempted to say that consent is valid if one has a right that
the normative consequences will not occur without one's consent.
To say this is to say both too much and too little. It is saying too
much in that the same normative consequences can sometimes be
reached by different routes. For example, a person may consent to
his child's staying the night with a friend only to find that his
spouse has already allowed the child to do so. It is saying too little
in that to ask for the reason for the validity of a consent to certain
normative consequences is the same as to ask for the reason for
recognizing a person as holding a certain right to bring about these
consequences.
Many justifications of consent are instrumental. If the rights or
duties consented to exist, then they and their creation will have
good consequences that outweigh the bad consequences to which
their creation or existence may lead. The most common type of
instrumental argument relies, as a reason for recognizing the validity of consent, on the facts that the agent has the best information
to judge whether it is best to create a right or not and that he is
sufficiently motivated to act for the best. One such case is where
the consent, if effective, will not affect third parties, provided that
the agent is a normal adult able to judge his own interests in the
area involved and that the same is true of the person receiving the
right, assuming he is able to refuse it if he so wishes. Other cases
11This case differs from the case in which the agent cognitively agreed, i.e., expressed a
belief that a person has certain rights in a situation in which he should have known that the
hearer may reasonably rely on the utterance to his detriment. The liability of the agent may
be similar in both cases, but the reasons for it differ in detail. A more complicated case is
the one known to lawyers as a warranty, where the agent, possibly believing that the right
exists, performatively agrees that it exists, i.e., guarantees its existence. Such a guarantee
can sometimes be given by an act that is both a cognitive and a performative agreement,
e.g., by saying that I agree that you are the leader.
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are those where the agent's knowledge and motivation can be
surmised from the circumstances of his life (parents or children) or
where a special arrangement is made to bring it about (e.g., when
legislators are periodically elected, thus providing them with motives to find out what are their electors' best interests and to satisfy them, at least where the prestige, power, and lawful remuneration of their office are their only rewards and where these rewards
are themselves substantial).
Another common instrumental justification of consent turns not
on the benefits of consenting but on the benefit of being able to do
so. It is sometimes a way of endowing a person with a responsibility that trains him to fulfill various roles in the future, or that it is
hoped will change his character for the better, or that endows its
holder with prestige, or that gives him a certain hold on other people and makes them be more likely to act in his interests.
There are no doubt other forms of instrumental justification, but
these are the most common. In addition to these or other kinds of
instrumental validation, consent can be given noninstrumental validation in many contexts. Through consenting, as through promising, a person attempts to fashion the shape of his moral world. All
too often, moralists tend to regard a person's moral life as the story
of how he proves himself in the face of the moral demands imposed on him by chance and circumstance. Crucial as this aspect
is, it is but one side of a person's moral history. The other side of
the story revolves around the person not as the object of demands
imposed from the outside but as the creator of such demands addressed to himself. We are all to a considerable degree the authors
of our moral world. This theme is impossible to explore here in
detail. A few brief observations will suffice for present purposes.
Essentially, this view of people as each one partly creating his
own moral world is to be justified through arguments concerning
the nature of morality and of moral knowledge. These provide the
framework within which generally valid considerations justify the
specific ways through which people can impose moral demands
upon themselves and can endow their life with value or with moral
significance. Broadly speaking, such considerations refer to two
kinds of moral value. First, and most obviously, they depend on
the value of some human relationships. The precise course of such
relations and the detailed moral requirements they generate depend on the way individuals choose to develop them and the dif-
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ferent normative implications with which they deliberately endow
the relations (consider, for example, the variety of morally permissible and even valuable courses that relations between children and
their parents can take, and their different moral implications).
With many relationships the case for self-creation is even stronger,
since in them the fact that one chose to have a relationship of a
certain kind and chose one's partner is part of what makes the relationship valuable (compare ideals of love of which this is true
with those of which it is not). The second kind of moral value involved in the justification of different ways in which persons mold
their moral world is the value of forming and pursuing projects
that give shape and content to one's life. This is reflected in our
admiration for people who have made something of their life,
sometimes against great odds, and in our somewhat disappointed
judgment of those who merely drift through life.
Consenting as well as promising often serves such projects and
relationships instrumentally, but beyond that it is sometimes a
constitutive element of relationships between people. There are relations that can be created by expressions of consent, and there are
many in which such acts form or can form a component of their
creation or perpetuation, a constituent element in their existence
being expressive of the person's continued acknowledgement of the
relation. Consenting to have one's mail opened by another, to be
visited without prior arrangement, and to have another arrange aspects of one's plans or activities without prior consultation in certain conditions (such as accepting invitations in one's name) may
or may not have instrumental value, but in any case such actions
are taken in our culture as expressing the existence of certain attitudes, as (in part) constituting those attitudes. What actions express an attitude is largely a matter of social convention. Our conventions and those of other societies do differ, but to the extent
that they regard consent as expressing certain worthwhile relations, as a constituent element of such relations, they provide validation of the appropriate kinds of consent.
VII.

CONSENT AND RESPECT

Turning to the relevance of consent to the obligation to obey
the law, we will here be concerned not with the well-known problem that most citizens in any given society have not consented to
the authority of their government, but with the prior question
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whether their consent, if given, would have been valid. The main
lesson of the discussion of the previous section is that judgment on
the validity of consent has to be discriminating. Consent may be
valid in certain contexts or subject to certain conditions and invalid in other contexts or when the conditions are not met. From the
fact that in some circumstances consent is valid, it does not follow
that consent to the government's authority is valid. One has to examine closely what arguments can establish the validity of such
consent.
Doubts about the validity of consent to political authority are
sometimes expressed on the ground that citizens have no choice
but to consent. Therefore, their consent is tainted by duress and is
invalid. Such arguments, useful as they are in showing that not
everything that some political theorists are willing to call consent
is consent, are powerless to establish the invalidity of genuine consent to a political authority. First, there is normally no pressure
amounting to duress on people to consent. I have not consented to
any political authority, and I have come to no harm. Duress that
invalidates consent consists either of a credible threat to take substantial action against the agent or against a person or a cause that
he values if he does not consent or to the taking of substantial
measures against him or against persons or causes that he values
with an offer to restore the situation if he does consent. Either
way, duress is always action designed to exert pressure in order to
secure the consent. This explains why duress invalidates consent.
There is no harm in a person using his power to consent in order to
avert a threat or to extricate himself or others from a dire situation. A person's power to confer rights on others by his consent
does, however, expose him to blackmail and abuse. Given that,
whatever the justification of giving him such power may be, it has
nothing to do with encouraging blackmail, such action frustrates
the purpose of validating the consent and is to be discouraged for
its bad consequences. Therefore, consent is invalidated by it. Consent to a political authority secured by threats of legal penalties is
not binding, but consent by a person in Hobbes's state of nature
can be perfectly valid.
Is consent to a political authority instrumentally valid? The assumptions on which this article is based are that an obligation to
obey the law is not a necessary condition for the existence of a just
government. In a society of morally conscientious citizens, a just
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government will enjoy all the support it requires even without any
belief in the obligation to obey the law. If this is so, the utility of
consent to the authority of just governments is to be seen as reinforcing other moral motives to support just institutions where
those may fail due to human ignorance or weakness. Consent may
produce the results that belief in other reasons should but may fail
to produce. This is of value generally, but is particularly important
in the case of government officials, because of their power to affect
the public-or sections of it-and because of the importance of
public confidence in their loyalty. The existing practice to require
an oath of loyalty from certain officeholders is best interpreted in
this light, i.e., as a way of reinforcing their natural obligations.
Against this undoubted benefit, one has to set the likely bad
consequences of recognizing the validity of consent to political authority. It may lead people to obey the law where, but for the consent, it would be better to disobey it. In these circumstances, the
factors that will tilt the balance in favor of obedience will be the
consent, i.e., in effect the reason that led to its being given. Those
are likely to be considerations of the agent's self-interest. They will
color his attitude to the laws of his country and may prevent the
agent from giving due weight to moral considerations. An extreme
example of this kind of distortion is provided by the scruples of
many German generals about breaking their oath of loyalty, which
they had given in order to be able to pursue their chosen careers in
the armed forces. Denying such consent any validity and educating
people in that conviction could prevent such distortions.
A second consideration against allowing consent to political authority's general validity turns on the undesirability of allowing
consent that binds for life and affects wide-ranging aspects of a
person's life. In these circumstances, the presumption that the
agent is a competent judge of what is best to do is very hard to
maintain. Regarding political authority, the most obvious danger is
of a change of government or a change of circumstances that turns
a reasonably just government into an unjust one. Human knowledge is as yet unable to predict such changes, the danger if not the
actual occurrence of which has been felt in all societies within our
lifetime. These costs of consent to political authority suggest that,
on instrumental grounds, it could be validly given only to a reasonably just government on condition that it remain so.
These restrictions apply also to the noninstrumental validation
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of consent to a government. Relationships and personal projects
are valuable only if they realize something of value. It is the autonomous realization or pursuit of a goal or an activity of value in
itself that makes relationships and personal projects valuable.
Hence, to the extent that consent is justified noninstrumentally as
a constitutive element in a relationship between a citizen and his
society, it is valid only if it exists between a citizen and a reasonably just society. I say a reasonably just society and not a reasonably just law, for consent to obey the law expresses not an attitude
to the law but an attitude to society and to the law as an aspect of
that society (which it can be only if it is felt to express social conventions and outlook).
There are various attitudes toward society that consent to the
authority of its laws can express. They can all be regarded as so
many variations of a basic attitude of identification with the society, an attitude of belonging and of sharing in its collective life.
Attitudes belonging to this family vary. They can be more or less
intense. They may be associated with some features of society
more than with others. They may, but need not, express themselves in one's attitude toward the law.
Rousseau's vision of the citizen's attitude toward his community
is, of course, an example of an attitude of identification. It is, however, an extreme example. Identification includes much less intense and less exclusive attitudes. A person who finds value in
identification need not be attracted by Rousseau's vision. He may
prefer one of the milder varieties of this attitude. All that is necessarily involved is a sense of belonging that excludes indifference to
the group as well as alienation from it.
That consent to be bound by the law is an expression of such an
attitude of loyalty and identification (i.e., a sense of belonging) is a
matter of fact. As was noted, the forms in which relations and attitudes express themselves are conventional. In many societies, the
convention regarding consent assumes formalized and ritualistic
forms, as with requirements to give such a formal consent upon
assuming an important public office or when naturalizing. These
are meant not merely, if at all, to serve a useful instrumental function, but also to be solemn, ritualized expressions of loyalty and
identification. To say this, of course, does not mean that the consent is not binding on the agent. It is precisely because it is
thought to be binding that it can function as an expression of iden-
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tification. For while the ways one expresses such attitudes and relationships are conventional, the means chosen by the convention
are suitable for their role by virtue of some of their features. Undertaking an obligation to be bound by the law is an appropriate
means of expressing identification with society, because it is a form
of supporting social institutions (see the earlier argument for the
instrumental validity of such consent), because it conveys a willingness to share in the common ways established in that society as
expressed by its institutions,' and because it expresses confidence
in the reasonableness and good judgment of the government
through one's willingness to take it on trust, as it were, that the
law is just and should be complied with.
The upshot of this discussion is that consent to the authority of
a just government is noninstrumentally valid if given as an expression of an attitude of identification with their society.13 Consent
theorists, correctly perceiving that consent to the authority of a
just government does endow it with authority over the agent (assuming that the other conditions for the validity of acts of consent
are fulfilled) and faced with the fact that few people actually consent to the authority of their government, have often tried to extend the notion of consent to cover more cases. What we need,
however, is not to stretch consent out of recognition but to examine whether the reasons that validate consent to authority cannot also be applied to some cases not involving consent; I think
that they can.
Many people regard themselves as under a defeasible obligation
to obey the law as such. With some, this view does not coherently
mesh with their other beliefs, and one cannot attribute to them
any coherent justification of their belief in such an obligation.
Others think that the obligation is based on the sort of reasons
that philosophers have adduced in support of an obligation to obey
the law and that have been refuted by the works cited at the beginning of this article. There are others still who do not provide
such fallacious arguments but regard the obligation as one incumSee J. Fmnis, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980).
1 agree with J. L. Mackie's comment that respect for law can express not identification
but some other attitudes, such as acknowledgement on the part of tourists that each country
is entitled to regulate its own affairs in its own way. See Mackie, Obligations to Obey the
Law, 67 VA. L. Rzv. 143, 154 (1981). I have focused attention on identification with the
society as being the most characteristic attitude thus expressed by citizens.
12
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bent on them because they are citizens of the state or members of
the society, because the government is their government or the law
their law. Whether this is the way they will express themselves
does not matter so long as we can establish that this is the substance of their view. Such views are often condemned as blind belief in an obligation without any reason. This is a mistake. They
indicate that their holders identify with their society and accept an
obligation to obey the law as expressing such an attitude. This
acceptance is not consent. It is probably not something made by
any specific act or at any specific time. It is likely to be the product of a gradual process as lengthy as the process of acquiring a
sense of belonging to a community and identifying with it. But in a
reasonably just society this acceptance of an obligation to obey the
law, this attitude of respect to the law, as I have called it elsewhere,' is as valid as an obligation acquired through consent and
for precisely the same reasons. It is instrumentally useful in the
same way, and it expresses the same worthwhile attitude of identification with the society.15 Therefore, people who share it have an
obligation to obey the law that they acquire through their conduct
of their own lives, as (part) authors of their own moral world.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Regarding those who consent to authority or respect the law, a
reasonably just government has authority, the right to command.
Not everyone consents or respects the law. Those who do not consent have no obligation to obey, but they owe the government the
lesser obligation to support just institutions and, of course, they
should comply with the law whenever there are good independent
reasons for doing so. Identification with a just society is a worthwhile attitude, but it is not obligatory. Nor need it, where it exists,
manifest itself by an attitude of respect to the law. There are
plenty of other ways in which it can express itself. It is morally
permissible for a person to adopt an attitude of conscientious
watchfulness, complying with the law only where reasons not de14

For a discussion of this attitude in greater detail, see J. RAZ, Respect for Law, in THE

AUTHORrrY OF LAW 250 (1979).
15 A belief in an obligation to

obey based on mistaken reasons is of course instrumentally
useful, but our commitment to the truth overrides such considerations.
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pendent on an obligation to obey indicate that this is what ought
to be done.

